Falling Behind the Curve: A Positive Analysis of Stop-Start Monetary Policies and the Great Inflation by Andrew Levin & John B. Taylor
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
FALLING BEHIND THE CURVE:









We appreciate comments and suggestions of Michael Bordo, Athanasios Orphanides, and participants
in the Great Inflation conference. This paper also has benefited greatly from invaluable conversations
with Bill English, Chris Erceg, Dale Henderson, Bob Hetzel, Brian Madigan, Ben McCallum, Edward
Nelson, and David Small, and from the excellent research assistance of Kathleen Easterbrook. The
views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, anyone else associated with the Federal
Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Andrew Levin and John B. Taylor. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Falling Behind the Curve:  A Positive Analysis of Stop-Start Monetary Policies and the Great
Inflation
Andrew Levin and John B. Taylor




This paper documents the evolution of long-run inflation expectations and models the stance of monetary
policy from 1965 to 1980. A host of survey-based measures and financial market data indicate that
long-run inflation expectations rose markedly from 1965 to 1969, leveled off in the mid-1970s, and
then rose at an alarming pace from 1977 to 1980. While previous studies have shown that the trajectory
of the federal funds rate over that period is not well-represented by a Taylor rule with a constant inflation
goal, our analysis indicates that the path of policy can be characterized by a reaction function with
two breaks in the intercept—in 1970 and 1976—that correspond to discrete shifts in an implicit inflation
goal. This reaction function implies that a series of stop-start episodes occurred in 1968-70, 1974-76,
and 1979-80. In each episode, policy fell behind the curve by allowing a pickup in inflation before
tightening belatedly, and then the subsequent contraction in economic activity led to policy easing
before inflation had been brought back down to its previous level. The evidence presented in this paper
raises serious doubts about several prominent theories of the Great Inflation and suggests that a simple




20th and C Street, NW
Washington, DC   20551
andrew.levin@frb.gov
John B. Taylor






1.  Introduction 
  U.S. consumer price inflation, which had been stable at around 1 percent in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, reached double-digit levels by the late 1970s.  This bout of inflation is commonly 
referred to as the “Great Inflation” and has been viewed as one of the most dramatic failures of 
U.S. monetary policy since the founding of the Federal Reserve.  Many analysts and commentators 
have sought to identify the primary causes of the Great Inflation; indeed, understanding its sources 
might help minimize the likelihood of a recurrence. 
  Of course, the U.S. economy was buffeted by a wide range of shocks over this period, 
including changes in fiscal policy during the late 1960s, a downward shift in structural productivity 
growth around 1970, wage and price controls in the early 1970s, and OPEC oil price hikes in 1973 
and 1979.  Moreover, some of those shocks had substantial short-term effects on inflation outcomes 
and contributed to an elevated level of uncertainty about the near-term inflation outlook.  
Nonetheless, as Meltzer (2010) emphasizes, a coherent explanation of the Great Inflation must 
account for the sources of the persistent upward drift in inflation over an extended period of about 
a decade and a half. 
  In this paper, we document the evolution of long-run inflation expectations and we model 
the stance of U.S. monetary policy over the period from 1960 to 1980. We use this evidence to 
distinguish among various explanations of the Great Inflation and draw lessons for the future.   
Despite the remarkable breadth of the existing literature, relatively scant attention has been paid  
to the behavior of long-run inflation expectations over this period.  Furthermore, most of the 
empirical studies have represented the conduct of monetary policy over the entire Great Inflation 
period using a linear reaction function with a fixed intercept, thereby assuming time-invariant 
values for the implicit inflation objective as well as for the equilibrium short-term real interest rate. 2 
 
We begin by considering several distinct measures of long-run inflation expectations,  
which indicate that such expectations rose markedly during the late 1960s, remained elevated at 
that plateau through the mid-1970s, and then rose at an alarming pace from 1977 until mid-1980.   
Next, we gauge the stance of monetary policy in terms of the ex ante short-term real interest rate, 
that is, the federal funds rate less the Livingston survey of one-year-ahead expected inflation.   
We then proceed to analyze the behavior of real interest rates and show that the course of monetary 
policy during the Great Inflation period can be represented as a series of stop-start episodes that 
occurred in 1968-70, 1974-76, and 1979-80.  In each case, policy tightening induced a contraction 
in economic activity, but that stance of policy was not maintained long enough to induce a 
sustained decline in the inflation rate.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 documents the evolution of 
long-run inflation expectations.  Section 3 models the stance of monetary policy.  Section 4 draws 
implications and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The Evolution of Inflation Expectations 
 
  In this section, we characterize three stylized facts regarding the evolution of long-run 
inflation expectations over the Great Inflation period.  
Stylized Fact #1:  The Great Inflation started in the mid-1960s.   
  The classic measure of short-run inflation expectations is the Livingston survey of  
one-year-ahead projections of consumer price inflation.  As recounted by Croushore (1997), this 
survey of business economists was initiated by Joseph Livingston in 1946 and is now conducted by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, which began providing support for the survey in the late 
1970s and assumed full responsibility in 1989.  Since its inception, the survey has been conducted 3 
 
in May and December of each year, shortly after the release of the preceding month’s consumer 
price index (CPI).
1  There have generally been about 50 respondents to each survey, including 
professional forecasters, chief economists of financial institutions and nonfinancial corporations, 
and a few academic and government economists.
2  Over the years, the Livingston survey  
has received widespread attention in the business press and has been analyzed in numerous 
research papers.
3   
  As shown in Figure 1, the Livingston survey indicates that short-run inflation expectations 
were stable at about 1 percent from 1956 until 1964, even though actual CPI inflation exhibited 
                                                 
1 Given this timing of the survey, the horizon of the inflation projections is not exactly one year but alternates between 
10 and 14 months—this modest degree of variation in the forecast horizon can be relevant for certain types of statistical 
tests but is not crucial for any of the analysis presented in this paper. 
2 In the mid-1990s, the sample of respondents included economists from nonfinancial businesses (30 percent), financial 
institutions (50 percent), academic institutions (13 percent), and other organizations including government agencies, 
labor unions, and insurance companies (8 percent).  For further discussion, see Croushore (1997). 
3 A comprehensive bibliography is available online at http://www.philadelphiafed.org . 
 
Figure 1 















Note:  The solid line depicts the realized four-quarter-average CPI inflation rate, and the dashed line 
depicts the median response to the Livingston survey regarding expected inflation over the year ahead. 
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substantial variation over this period.  An inflation rate of around 1 percent was viewed as broadly 
consistent with the Federal Reserve’s mandate under the Employment Act of 1946, which 
established the objectives of “maximum employment, production, and purchasing power”  
for all federal agencies.
4   
  In 1956-57, for example, realized CPI inflation reached a peak of nearly 4 percent, but  
one-year-ahead inflation expectations remained well-anchored, reflecting the private sector’s 
confidence that the stance of monetary policy was consistent with inflation returning to around  
1 percent within a year.  In effect, business economists and professional forecasters did not expect 
these inflation fluctuations to be very persistent, but instead anticipated that inflation would subside 
quite quickly.  Indeed, the firm anchoring of inflation expectations during the late 1950s and early 
1960s may have contributed to the relatively low persistence of actual inflation over this period.
5 
  Starting in 1965, however, a sharply different pattern of expectations formation becomes 
evident in the Livington survey:  Short-run inflation expectations began rising in parallel with 
actual inflation and reached about 4 percent by 1970, indicating that forecasters anticipated that  
the upswing in actual inflation would not be purely transitory.  Moreover, by 1971-72, short-run 
inflation expectations were virtually identical to actual CPI inflation, consistent with the view that 
policymakers would allow inflation to stay at around 4 percent rather than taking any decisive 
action to return to an environment of price stability. 
  A large empirical literature has made note of the persistent negative forecast errors that 
were associated with survey measures of inflation expectations from the mid-1960s through the late 
1970s.  For an environment with stable linear inflation dynamics, such results might be interpreted 
                                                 
4 The Employment Act of 1946 also established the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), which subsequently stated that 
the Act “provides a tried and successful institutional framework for the coordination of economic policies to the end of 
maximizing employment and production within a framework of price stability and growth.” (JEC Report, March 1966, 
p.2)  A year later, the JEC indicated that “Prices rose too rapidly in 1966 and are in danger of doing so again in 1967.”  
(JEC Report, March 1967, p.18) 
5 For further discussion, see Bordo and Schwartz (1999), Sargent (1999), Levin and Piger (2004), and Benati (2008).   5 
 
as pointing to the “irrationality” of survey respondents.  In contrast, persistent forecast errors are 
associated with the optimal forecast in a Markov regime-switching environment where the current 
state is not directly observed by private agents; cf. Evans and Wachtel (1988).
6 
  Yields on Treasury securities provide additional confirmation that inflation expectations 
began to shift markedly around 1965.  In particular, Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007) employed 
the methodology of Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Svensson (1994) to fit daily data on the entire 
term structure of bond yields since 1961, thereby obtaining a smoothed yield curve that can be used 
to compute forward interest rates at each date.  During the 1960s and early 1970s, the 7-year bond 
was the longest maturity issue that was auctioned regularly by the U.S. Treasury, and hence for this 
period Gurkaynak et al. (2007) constructed daily series of one-year forward nominal interest rates 
for horizons up to six years ahead.  Henceforth, we refer to the six-year-ahead forward interest rate 
as the “far-ahead forward rate;” it should be noted, however, that we have conducted sensitivity 
analysis which confirms that all of our conclusions are robust to the use of forward rates at even 
longer horizons (which are available starting in the early 1970s). 
  To make inferences from far-forward nominal interest rates regarding the evolution of  
long-run inflation expectations, we assume that the far-forward real short-term interest rate has a 
constant value of 2 percent and that the term premium has a constant value of 1 percent.  The 
constancy of the far-forward real interest rate is consistent with the view that the real economy 
would be expected to converge to its balanced growth path over a 7-year horizon, and the value of 
2 percent for the equilibrium short-term real interest rate is the same as embedded in the Taylor 
(1993) rule.    Of course, investors might well perceive the equilibrium real interest rate as time-
varying, especially in response to a persistent shift in productivity growth like the one that occurred 
during the 1970s.  Indeed, a long literature has documented the extent to which term premiums 
                                                 
6 Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) provide further evidence on the efficiency of survey-based inflation forecasts. 6 
 
vary over time, reflecting movements in the perceived distribution of returns as well as in the 
market price of risk.  Nonetheless, as discussed further below, the variations in the far-forward real 
interest rate and in the term premium appear to be fairly small compared with the marked shifts in 
expected inflation that occurred during the Great Inflation, so that this measure of long-run 
inflation expectations can be very useful, at least as a rough gauge. 
  As depicted by the solid line in Figure 2, this measure indicates that long-run inflation 
expectations were quite stable from 1961 until early 1965 at a rate just above 1 percent, consistent 
with the implications from the Livingston survey.  In effect, this evidence confirms that during the 
early 1960s inflation expectations were firmly anchored at a level broadly consistent with the 
Federal Reserve’s mandate of price stability.   
  In 1965, however, this measure exhibits a fairly dramatic kink:  Far-forward inflation 
expectations began to drift upward steadily, reaching a peak of about 4½ percent in 1970,  
and then remained in the range of 3½ to 4½ percent over the next several years.  Again, this  
pattern is consistent with the implications of the Livingston survey—not only that inflation 
expectations drifted upward during 1965-70, but that these expectations remained at an elevated 
plateau during the early 1970s. 
  Importantly, these findings regarding the early stages of the Great Inflation are not sensitive 
to alternative assumptions about the determination of real interest rates or term premium.  For 
example, a recent study by Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008) also provides a measure of long-run 
expected inflation implied by a no-arbitrage factor model of the term structure.  Their analytical 
framework utilizes latent factors and allows for Markov switching among four different regimes, 
and was estimated using data over the period 1952:2 to 2004:4 for CPI inflation and zero-coupon 
Treasury yields at four maturities (1, 4, 12, and 20 quarters).     7 
 
 
  As shown by the dashed line in Figure 2, the five-year average expected inflation rate 
produced by the no-arbitrage factor model of Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008) moves largely  
in parallel with the measure implied by far-forward nominal interest rates.  During the early 1960s, 
the no-arbitrage measure is nearly a percentage point higher than the measure based on far-forward 
rates, because the factor model implies that the real interest rate and the inflation risk premium 
were a bit below their historical averages during this period.  (Of course, that implication might 
change if the Livingston survey were incorporated into the estimation procedure.)  More broadly, 
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1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
Implied by Far-Forward Nominal Rates
No-Arbitrage Factor Model
U. Michigan survey of consumer sentiment
Decision-Makers Poll of portfolio managers 
Blue Chip survey of professional forecasters
 
Note:  The solid line depicts the forward rate of expected inflation six years ahead, using nominal forward 
rates computed by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) and subtracting a constant far-forward real rate  
of 2 percent and a constant term peremium of 1 percent.  The dashed line depicts the 5-year expected 
inflation rate from the no-arbitrage factor model of Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008).  The three survey  
measures of long-run inflation expectations are defined in the notes to Table 1. 8 
 
however, the factor model underscores the findings noted above:  Inflation expectations were 
relatively low and stable during the early 1960s, began rising steadily in 1965, and reached a peak 
of about 5 percent by 1970. 
  Moreover, while no direct surveys of long-run inflation expectations were conducted during 
this period, the view that the Great Inflation started around 1965 is certainly corroborated by  
the general tenor of media reports, congressional hearings, and academic conferences through  
the remainder of the decade.  Indeed, as shown in Figure 3, editorial cartoons provide 
contemporary evidence of widespread public concerns about the upward drift in inflation from 
1965 to 1969. 
  In summary, the evidence from the Livingston survey and from bond yield data  
demonstrates conclusively that the roots of the Great Inflation can be traced back to around 1965.   
This conclusion is consistent with the broad assessment of DeLong (1997), who argued that the 
Great Inflation began well before 1970. 
Stylized Fact #2:  Long-run inflation expectations remained at a plateau of about 4 to 5 percent  
during the first half of the 1970s and shifted upwards rapidly over the remainder of the decade.   
  In the mid- to late 1970s, several surveys of inflation expectations began to include 
questions regarding respondents’ expectations at longer horizons.  In spring 1975, for example,  
the University of Michigan’s survey of consumer sentiment started asking occasionally about  
the expected average CPI inflation rate over the next 5 to 10 years.  In mid-1978, Richard Hoey’s 




Perspectives on the Early Years of the Great Inflation (1965-69) 
  November 1965  November 1966 
            
“Latest paddle at the Washington woodshed”   “Could stand some escalation.” 
 
 
  February 1969  December 1969 
            
 
“He keeps getting bigger and bigger all the time.”                    “Signals—hut... hut?” 
 
Credits:  Upper left:  Kuekes, Cleveland Plain Dealer, reprinted in New York Times (NYT) on November 
28, 1965, p.E9.  Upper-right:  Hesse, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, reprinted in NYT on November 27, 1966, 
p.E6.  Lower-left:  Canfield, Newark Evening News, reprinted in NYT on February 2, 1969, p.E13.   
Lower-right:  Canfield, Newark Evening News, reprinted in NYT on December 7, 1969, p.E11. 
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about the expected average CPI inflation rate over the coming decade.
7  And in fall 1979, Blue 
Chip Economics Indicators began asking about the longer-run outlook in its survey of professional 
forecasters, including a question about the expected 10-year average inflation rate for the gross 
national product (GNP) deflator.
8   
  Table 1 reports the median value of the long-run inflation projections from each of these 
three surveys over the period from 1975 through the end of 1980; these survey results are  
also plotted in Figure 2.  Although the timing of the surveys is quite uneven over this period,  
the results can be directly compared in 1979 and 1980, and the degree of consistency in long-run 
inflation expectations across the three groups of respondents—households, institutional portfolio 
managers, and professional forecasters—seems particularly remarkable in light of the volatility of 
actual inflation over this period.   
  Moreover, as shown in Figure 2 above, these survey-based measures of long-run inflation 
expectations line up quite closely with the two indicators derived from the term structure of 
nominal interest rates, further bolstering our confidence that these measures serve as useful gauges 
of the evolution of long-run inflation expectations.   
  The Michigan survey indicates that household expectations regarding the longer-run 
inflation outlook stayed in the range of 4½ to 5½ percent from mid-1975 until early 1977,  
a range that is very similar to that of the two expectations measures derived from bond yield  
data and to the levels of these two measures at the beginning of the decade.  Evidently, long-run  
                                                 
7 The Decision-Makers Poll was initiated when Richard B. Hoey was employed at Bache, Halsey, Stuart & Shields, 
and he continued to conduct the survey when he moved to Warburg, Paribus, & Becker, then to Drexel, Burnham, 
Lambert, and finally to Barclays de Zoete Wedd Research.  The number of respondents varied between 175  
and 500 and included chief investment officers, corporate financial officers, bond and stock portfolio managers,  
industry analysts, and economists.  Although the survey was originally disseminated via proprietary newsletters,  
Holland (1984) received permission to publish the median survey responses for long-run inflation expectations;  
see also Economic Report of the President (1985, chapter 1), Havrilesky (1988) and Darin and Hetzel (1995). 
8 Although Blue Chip Economic Indicators is a proprietary survey, the median responses for long-run inflation 
expectations are publicly available for 1979 to 1991 and can be downloaded from http://www.philadelphiafed.org .   11 
 
Table 1 
Surveys of Long-Run Inflation Expectations, 1975-1980 
 
 




Blue Chip Survey 
(professional forecasters) 
1975Q2  4.5 ---  --- 
Q3  5.5 ---  --- 
1976Q1  5.0 ---  --- 
Q3  5.4 ---  --- 
Q4  4.8 ---  --- 
1977Q1  5.0 ---  --- 
Q2  5.4 ---  --- 
1978Q3  --- 6.2  --- 
1979Q1  7.2 ---  --- 
Q2  --- 6.8  --- 
Q4  --- ---  6.9 
1980Q1  9.7 ---  --- 
Q2  --- ---  7.9 
Q3  9.0 8.6  --- 
Q4  --- 8.8  8.3 
 
Note:  This table reports the median of respondents’ projections for three surveys:   
The University of Michigan survey of consumer sentiment asked about average CPI inflation  
over the next 5 to 10 years; the Decision-Makers Poll survey of institutional portfolio managers 
asked about average CPI inflation over the next 10 years; and the Blue Chip Economic Indicators 
survey of professional forecasters asked about the average GNP price inflation rate over the  




inflation expectations had remained around this plateau since about 1970; that is, policymakers 
were not successful in bringing down long-run inflation expectations but did at least manage to 
avoid any marked upward shift over the period through early 1977. 
  Starting in mid-1977, however, long-run inflation expectations began rising at  
an alarming pace.  The Michigan survey indicates that these expectations rose sharply from 5 
percent in early 1977 to around 7 percent by early 1979 and to more than 9 percent by early 1980.  12 
 
The results of the Decision-Makers Poll are very similar, with long-run inflation expectations rising 
from about 6 percent in mid-1978 to about 7 percent in mid-1979 and to nearly 9 percent by 1980.  
Again, these trajectories are very close to those of the two indicators derived from term structure 
data, which rose from 5 percent in early 1977 to about 8½ percent by early 1980. 
Stylized Fact #3:  Long-run inflation expectations did not begin to ebb until late 1980   
  Long-run inflation expectations did not start shifting downward until late 1980.  This 
characteristic is apparent from the two indicators derived from term structure data as well as from 
the survey-based measures.  In the Decision-Makers survey, for example, long-run inflation 
expectations rose from 6¾ percent in mid-1979 to about 8½ percent in mid-1980 and then peaked 
at about 8¾ percent that October; indeed, this measure did not return to around 6¾ percent until 
spring 1982.  Similarly, the Blue Chip survey measure of long-run inflation expectations was 
around 7 percent in fall 1979—the first time that this question was included in the survey—but  
rose to about 8 percent in spring 1980 and peaked at 8¼ percent in fall 1980.   
  The absence of any noticeable decline—and indeed, perhaps even a further pickup—of 
long-run inflation expectations in 1980 appears to have reflected continuing skepticism about the 
prospects for making lasting progress on the inflation front.  Editorial cartoons—such as those 
shown in Figure 4—can provide a distinct perspective regarding that skepticism.  In particular,  
the broad tenor of editorial cartoons in early 1980 was essentially unchanged from a year earlier, 
exhibiting only limited confidence that policymakers would take decisive steps to reverse the 
upward drift in inflation.  
  In October 1979, about two months after Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the 
Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve switched operating procedures, resulting in an 
unprecedented jump in the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates.  At least initially, 13 
 
the switch in operating procedures may have appeared to be aimed primarily at stemming the 
upward spiral of actual and expected inflation rather than at bringing the inflation rate down.  For 
example, Volcker told the Joint Economic Committee in February 1980 that those policy measures 
signalled “unwillingness to finance an accelerating rate of inflation.”  (Volcker 1980, p.77)   
  Given that a shift in monetary policy tends to affect aggregate demand and inflation with 
“long and variable lags” (Friedman 1961, p.464), it would have been reasonable to anticipate that  
several quarters might pass before seeing clear evidence of the impact of the October 1979 policy 
measures.  Nevertheless, the Carter administration was apparently reluctant to wait that long, 
perhaps in part because of the approaching presidential primaries and a general election later in the 
year.
9   As the Administration later explained, “Early in 1980, there were few signs of recession.   
If anything, activity seemed to be picking up....By early March, there was fear that inflationary 
pressures...were mounting...and that without some additional action, these would...lead to an 
explosion of prices.”
  (Economic Report of the President, January 1981, pp.160-161) 
  In mid-March 1980, President Carter issued an executive order authorizing the Federal 
Reserve to impose controls on the growth of credit.  President Carter explained the rationale as 
follows:  “The traditional tools used by the Federal Reserve to control money and credit expansion 
are a basic part of the fight on inflation.  But in present circumstances, those tools need to be 
reinforced so that effective restraint can be achieved in ways that spread the burden reasonably  
and fairly.”  (Carter 1980, pp.7-8)  Using that authority, the Federal Reserve initiated the Credit 
Restraint Program (CRP), a set of measures that included voluntary restraints for a wide range of 
                                                 
9 As noted by Schreft (1990), Senator Edward Kennedy—Carter’s major opponent for the Democratic Party 
nomination—gave a campaign speech in January 1980 describing inflation as “out of control.”  Moreover, 
contemporary newspaper accounts indicated that Carter’s advisers “hoped that the anti-inflation program [announced  
in March] would be accepted by the public, thus giving the President an advantage over the other contenders for the 
Democratic nomination.” (Schreft 1990, p.35) 14 
 
financial institutions as well as the imposition of reserve requirements for all lenders (not just 
commercial banks) on increases in certain types of consumer credit.
10  
  Although the CRP was not expected to have a major impact on consumer behavior, 
incoming data during spring 1980 revealed sharp declines in credit aggregates, retail sales,  
and business spending.  Even though the credit controls were eased substantially during May,  
“the economy was so weak by late June that the controls were nonbinding.” (Schreft 1990, p.43)   
The Federal Reserve announced the phaseout of the CRP in early July, less than four months  
after the credit controls were imposed.    
  After the sharp drop in economic activity during the second quarter of 1980, economists 
generally anticipated that the contraction would continue through the end of the year and would be 
nearly as severe at the 1974-75 recession.  Under the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures, 
however, broad monetary aggregates recovered quickly during late spring and summer, and 
relatively accommodative monetary conditions apparently contributed to an unexpectedly brisk 
pace of economic recovery.  For example, M1 (which had grown at an annual rate of about  
7½ percent from October 1979 through February 1980 and then dropped sharply during March  
and April) exhibited a robust growth rate of about 15 percent from June through September 1980.  
Meanwhile, the federal funds rate (which was around 13 percent during fall 1979 and winter 1980) 
dropped to around 9 percent in spring 1980 and remained at that level through September.  Over 
the same period, core CPI inflation was also running at an annual rate of about 9 percent, and the 
short-term inflation expectations in the Livingston survey remained close to 10 percent—about the 
same level as in late 1979.   
    
                                                 
10 Schreft (1990, pp.35-38) provides a detailed description of the CRP, which also included four other measures:   
an increase in the marginal reserve requirement on managed liabilities of large banks; a special deposit requirement  
on additions to the managed liabilities held by non-member banks; a special deposit requirement on any additional 




      
 
Figure 4 
Perspectives on the Final Years of the Great Inflation (1979-80) 
 
  May 1979  February 1980 
        
   “The fly vs. the flyswatter”   “USA!  USA!  Is it working? USA!”  
 
 
  March 1980  March 1980 
        
 “Stop worrying, y’all—it’s guaranteed   “New!  Long-Range Anti-Inflation Ammo” 
  to open on impact.” 
 
Credits:  Upper-left:  Wright, NYT, May 1979.  Upper-right:  Washington Post, February 1980.   
Lower-left:  Oliphant, Washington Post, March 1980.  Lower-right:  Washington Post, March 1980. 
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  Thus, looking at the entire period from October 1979 through September 1980, the 
evolution of monetary and credit conditions likely contributed to the variability of real economic 
activity but did not succeed in bringing down actual or expected inflation.  In contrast, long-term 
inflation expectations finally began to recede after the Volcker Fed maintained its disinflationary 
policy during 1981-82 despite the sharp contraction in economic activity.  
 
3.  An Empirical Model of Monetary Policy during the Great Inflation 
 
  In this section, we gauge the stance of monetary policy in terms of the ex ante short-term 
real interest rate—that is, the federal funds rate less the Livingston survey of one-year-ahead 
expected inflation—and we formulate an empirical model of the evolution of monetary policy 
during the Great Inflation period.  A number of previous studies—including Clarida, Gali, Gertler 
(1998) and Taylor (1999)—have focused on interest rate rules with fixed coefficients and have 
shown that monetary policy did not satisfy the Taylor principle over this period; that is, the federal 
funds rate was not raised by more than one-for-one in response to movements in actual inflation  
as would be implied by the Taylor (1993) rule.  Here we extend that earlier analysis by allowing  
for discrete shifts in the intercept of the policy rule.  This approach is useful in accounting for the 
possibility of occasional upward shifts in the Federal Reserve’s implicit inflation objective—as 
suggested by the evidence on long-run inflation expectations—and provides a representation for  
the stop-start pattern of policy tightening and easing that we discussed in the previous section.       
To see this, let 
(1)  ** () () y tt t t rr yy π γπ π γ =+ − + −  
where  t r  is the short-term real interest rate,  t π  is the actual inflation rate,  * π  is the central bank’s 
objective for the inflation rate, and  *
tt yy − .is the output gap. If the slope coefficients 17 
 
y π γγ == 0.5, then the real interest rate should be raised by 50 basis points in response to a  
one percentage point increase in the inflation rate relative to target or the output gap.  We assume 
that  2 r =  is the steady-state value of the real interest rate.  We now proceed to show that by 
permitting simple shifts in the implicit inflation objective  * π , equation (1) provides a good fit of 
the real interest rate during the Great Inflation.  We first must describe how we measure the other 
variables in the equation.  
Measuring the Real Interest Rate.   
  When inflation is fairly inertial, the current inflation rate may provide a reasonable estimate 
for expected inflation going forward.  In such a situation the real interest rate can be computed by 
subtracting the current inflation rate from the nominal rate. In that case, equation (1) can be written 
with the nominal rate on the left hand side and the inflation rate added to the right hand side, 
yielding the Taylor rule.  But if inflation is more variable—as in the Great Inflation period—it is 
necessary to get a better measure of inflation expectations.  For this purpose, we use the Livingston 
survey of one-year-ahead CPI inflation projections.  An advantage of this measure is that it was 
available nearly two decades prior to the onset of the Great Inflation.  Accordingly, our analysis 
focuses on the real federal funds rate at a quarterly frequency, computed by subtracting the 
Livingston survey measure from the quarterly average of the nominal federal funds rate.
11   
Measuring the Output Gap and the Inflation Rate.   
As emphasized by Orphanides (2002, 2003), the use of real-time estimates of the output 
gap—as opposed to retrospective estimates constructed at a much later date—can have crucial 
implications in making assessments of the stance of monetary policy, especially because the 
difference between real-time vs. retrospective estimates of the output gap may be quite large during 
                                                 
11 The Livingston survey is conducted semiannually, in May and November; thus, we use linear interpolation to obtain  
a quarterly time series of one-year-ahead inflation expectations.  18 
 
periods in which there are substantial shifts in trend productivity growth or the natural 
unemployment rate.   
  There are no extant records from the 1960s or 1970s regarding real-time Federal Reserve 
staff estimates of potential output or the output gap.  Thus, following Orphanides (2002, 2003),  
one approach is to utilize the real-time assessments of potential output and the output gap that were 
constructed by the Council of Economic Advisors and published annually in the Economic Report 
of the President (ERP).  And during the late 1960s, those estimates may well serve as a useful  
real-time proxy for the assessments that would have been relevant for policymakers at that time.  
Unfortunately, however, as the CEA estimates became increasingly politicized during the 1970s, 
neither economic analysts nor policymakers continued paying serious attention to these estimates. 
   Therefore, following the approach of Cecchetti et al. (2007), we construct another proxy 
for the real-time output gap by applying a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to each vintage  
of real GNP drawn from the Philadelphia Fed’s real-time dataset, using a smoothing parameter  
of 1600.
12  While the Hodrick-Prescott method was not available in the 1970s, it corresponds  
well with less formal procedures economic analysts use to assess trends.
13 
  As shown in Figure 5, the HP filtered series for the real-time output gap is very similar  
to the CEA series during the late 1960s, but the two measures diverge quite dramatically starting  
in 1970.  In particular, from 1966 to 1969, both series imply that the output gap was fairly close  
to zero—roughly 5 percentage points below the CBO’s most recent retrospective estimate, which 
we henceforth refer to as the “true” output gap.  In contrast, the CEA estimates indicate a dramatic 
widening of the output gap through the mid-1970s; indeed, the trough of about -15 percent during  
1975 suggests that the magnitude of slack in the economy was approaching that of the Great 
                                                 
12 We have confirmed that the results are virtually identical for alternative values of the smoothing parameter. 
13 Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy and Papell (2009) analyze the implications of alternative proxies for the real-time output gap 
based on linear and quadratic detrending procedures. 19 
 
Depression—an implication that underscores the pitfalls of using the CEA series as a real-time 
measure of the output gap.  In contrast, the HP filtered measure remains only a few percentage 
points below the “true” output gap through the early 1970s, reaching a trough of about -6 percent  
in early 1975 before recovering sharply and then remaining positive from 1976 through 1979. 
  We measure actual inflation using the realized four-quarter average CPI inflation rate at 
each date, that is, the same definition of inflation as in the Livingston survey projections.  For this 
measure of inflation, there is no distinction between real-time vs. revised vintages of data, because 
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Retrospective CBO estimate
Real-time CEA assessments
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Note:  This figure depicts three estimates of the output gap over the period 1965:1 through 1980:4.   
The  solid line depicts the retrospective estimates of the Congressional Budget Office, using all data 
available through 2007.  The short-dashed line depicts the contemporaneous estimates of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, published annually in the Economic Report of the President.  The long-dashed line 
depicts the estimate obtained by applying a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter to each vintage of real GNP 
taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s real-time dataset. 20 
 
Discrete Shifts in the Implicit Inflation Objective. 
Now consider the inflation objective,  * π .  Of course, policymakers did not have an  
explicit inflation goal during the 1960s and 1970s.   As an empirical matter, however, discrete 
shifts in the implicit inflation objective can be detected by testing for structural breaks in the 
regression intercept for equation (1).   
Figure 6 provides a graphical depiction of these structural breaks by comparing the 
evolution of the short-term real interest rate with prescriptions of the Taylor (1993) rule,  
using three alternative values of the implicit inflation goal:  1 percent, 5 percent, and 8 percent.   
This figure highlights a sequence of three stop-start episodes that appear to have occurred  
in 1968-70, 1974-76, and 1979-80.   
In each of those episodes, the stance of monetary policy evolved in three distinct stages:   
(1) policy remained passive while inflation begins to pick up; (2) policy shifted to a contractionary 
stance once the inflation rate exceeded a particular threshold, where the value of the threshold 
depended on the previous inflation peak; and (3) contracting economic activity caused the policy 
tightening to stop before inflation converged back to its initial rate.  While the stance of monetary 
policy followed a roughly similar stop-start pattern in each case, it should be noted that the 
underlying reasons for that pattern differ across the three episodes:  In 1970 and in 1976, 
policymakers intentionally shifted to a more accommodative stance, whereas the 1979-80 episode 
occurred during a period in which the Federal Reserve employed a reserves-oriented operating 

















1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
Real Federal Funds Rate
Taylor rule (pi* = 1%)
Taylor rule (pi* = 5%)
Taylor rule (pi* = 8%)
Note:  The solid blue line depicts the ex ante real federal funds rate, using the Livingston survey  
as the measure of expected inflation.  The other lines depict prescriptions of the Taylor (1993) rule  
for three specifications of the inflation objective:  1 percent (short-dashed), 5 percent (long-dashed),  
and 8 percent (dash-dotted). 22 
 
Regression Analysis. 
  The graphical implications of Figure 6 are confirmed by regression analysis of a policy  
rule that incorporates interest rate smoothing and that allows for discrete shifts in the regression 
intercept, using quarterly data for the period 1965q4 to 1980q3.  The regression equation has the 
following form: 
(2) FFRt =co + ρFFRt-1 + (1-ρ)[α( PI4CPIt  -  δ1DUM70t   -  δ2DUM76t)  +  βYGAPt ] 
where FFR is the federal funds rate, PI4CPI is the four-quarter-average CPI inflation rate,  
YGAP is the one-sided HP-filter estimate of output gap, DUM70 equals 1 for t ≥ 1970q2  
and 0 otherwise, and DUM76 equals 1 for t ≥ 1976q1 and 0 otherwise.
14  It should be noted that  
the first dummy variable allows for the possibility of a shift in the implicit inflation objective when 
Arthur Burns became Federal Reserve chairman, and the second dummy variable allows for 
another shift that occurred at the onset of the election year of 1976.   
As shown in the top panel of Table 2, the regression results in the absence of intercept shifts 
(that is, imposing the restriction δ1 = δ2 = 0) are very similar to those reported in earlier studies.   
In particular, the estimated policy rule exhibits a very high degree of interest rate smoothing  
(ρ = 0.83) and a fairly aggressive response to the output gap (β = 1.85).  Moreover, the coefficient 
on inflation is very close to unity, confirming that policy did not satisfy the Taylor principle during 
this period; that is, the stance of policy was not tightened sufficiently to stabilize inflation around  
a constant objective. 
                                                 
14 This reaction function is specified in terms of the contemporaneous values for the CPI inflation rate and the one-
sided HP-filtered output gap, consistent with policymakers’ careful monitoring of the latest data releases and other 
economic news.  An alternative approach would be to specify the reaction function solely in terms of lagged values of 
the output gap, thereby implying that policymakers had no current-quarter information about real economic activity.  
Both hypotheses can be nested in a single policy reaction function; the regression results for that nested specification 
(not shown here) confirm that the contemporaneous output gap is statistically significant while the coefficient on the 
lagged output gap is close to zero. 23 
 
Now consider allowing for shifts in the regression intercept in 1970q2 and 1976q1.   
From the middle panel of Table 2, it is evident that these dummy variables are highly significant, 
with t-statistics exceeding 4, and the estimated coefficients δ1 and δ2 indicate that the Fed's implicit 
inflation objective rose by about 2 percentage points at each of these dates.  Indeed, while these 
two breakdates have been treated as known a priori (based on the key points in Burns’ tenure as 
Federal Reserve chairman), the significance levels are so high that breaks close to these two dates 
would be confirmed even by procedures that test for the presence of structural breaks at an 
unknown set of dates and that tend to exhibit substantially lower empirical power.  Moreover, once 
we account for these two shifts in the implicit inflation objective, the coefficient on inflation in the 
policy rule is significantly greater than unity.  The statistical significance of this coefficient mainly 
reflects the relatively tight stance of monetary policy in 1974-75 that was aimed at preventing the 
deterioration in the near-term inflation outlook from becoming embedded in longer-run inflation 
expectations.   
Of course, given that the output gap and inflation rate are endogenously determined,  
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression only yields consistent estimates of the policy rule 
coefficients under a specific set of identifying assumptions, namely, that these two explanatory 
variables do not respond contemporaneously to adjustments in the federal funds rate.
15  Thus, it is 
helpful to perform sensitivity analysis via instrumental variables (IV) estimation, which does not 
require those identifying assumptions.  As shown in the bottom panel of Table 2, the IV estimates 
are essentially the same as the OLS estimates, but the standard errors are somewhat higher and 
hence the confidence intervals are correspondingly somewhat wider.     
                                                 
15 These identifying assumptions are frequently employed in structural VAR analysis of monetary policy shocks;  
cf. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998) and Hetzel (2008, pp.276ff.) for further discussion. 24 
 
Table 2 
Regression Evidence on Start-Stop Monetary Policies during the Great Inflation 
 
OLS Estimation Without Shifts in Intercept 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic 
co 0.15 0.39 0.37 
ρ  0.83 0.11 7.54 
α  1.07 0.34 3.08 
β  1.82 1.33 1.36 
OLS Estimation Allowing for Intercept Shifts 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic 
co 0.40 0.36 1.11 
ρ  0.61 0.10 5.89 
α  1.41 0.20 7.08 
β  1.24 0.38 3.30 
δ1 1.94 0.49 3.97 
δ2 2.10 0.53 3.93 
 
IV Estimation Allowing for Intercept Shifts 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic 
co 0.31 0.37 0.84 
ρ  0.70 0.12 5.81 
α  1.48 0.28 5.21 
β  1.53 0.62 2.44 
δ1 2.05 0.62 3.30 
δ2  2.21 0.68 3.26 
 
Note:  The upper and middle panels report the results of ordinary-least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (2),  
and the lower panel indicates the results of instrumental variable (IV) estimation, where the instruments include  
a constant, DUM70, DUM76, the lagged values of PI4CPI and YGAP, and two lagged values of RFFE.   
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4. Assessing Some Prominent Explanations for the Great Inflation 
  What are the implications of these stylized facts about inflation expectations and the 
evolving stance of monetary policy?  In our view, these facts raise serious doubts about most  
of the prominent explanations of the Great Inflation, point to an alternative explanation, and 
suggest a way to prevent reoccurrences in the future. 
Faulty Economic Theories 
  The evidence in Sections 2 and 3 is not consistent with the view that changes in economic 
theory were the primary source of swings in trend inflation—an interpretation that has previously 
been emphasized by one of us (Taylor, 1997).
16  While the rise in actual and expected inflation 
during the second half of the 1960s—the height of the period when many economists supported  
the notion of a stable long-run Phillips curve—may suggest that economic theory had a significant 
impact on actual policy over that period, the rapid surge in inflation during the second half of the 
1970s—by which point most economists had concluded that there was no long-run Phillips curve 
tradeoff—raises strong doubts about such an explanation for the Great Inflation. 
  Our assessment of the limited role of faulty economic theories in the Great Inflation is 
consistent with the narrative analysis of Meltzer (2003, 2010a, 2010b).  In particular, Federal 
Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin, Jr. was a pragmatist who “did not find economic 
models useful and...gave most attention to market data and market participants, not economists,” 
while Burns was “an empirical economist who disdained deductive models,” and most other 
FOMC members “were not ideologues or slavish adherents to a particular theory.”
17  Meltzer also 
notes that the problem of inflation “was not new in 1965, and it was not new to Martin.”
18 Indeed, 
                                                 
16 See also Romer and Romer (2002a, 2002b, 2004). 
17 Meltzer (2010b), Chapter 7, p.11. 
18 Meltzer (2010a), Chapter 3, p. 149. 26 
 
Martin had been successful in ending two previous surges of inflation during the 1950s, and as 
discussed further below, the policy tightening that Martin initiated in 1969 presumably would have 
resulted in substantial disinflation if it had been maintained beyond the end of his term in January 
1970. 
Aggregate Supply Shocks   
  Over the past several decades, a number of studies have attributed the Great Inflation to  
the influence of adverse aggregate supply shocks; cf. Blinder (1982), Hetzel (1998), Mayer (1998), 
and Ireland (2007).  According to this hypothesis, Federal Reserve policies systematically 
translated transitory shocks to the price level into persistent upward shifts in the inflation rate.  
  Nonetheless, the evidence in Section 2 on the evolution of inflation expectations is not 
consistent with the view that aggregate supply shocks were at the roots of the Great Inflation.  First, 
the Livingston survey and bond yield data indicate that inflation expectations started rising during 
the late 1960s, well before the onset of sharp increases in the prices of oil and other commodities.
19  
Second, longer-run inflation expectations remained at around 4 to 5 percent from 1970 through 
1975, despite the oil price shock triggered by the OPEC embargo in mid-1973.  Third, longer-run 
inflation expectations spiraled upward from 1976 through mid-1979, a period when energy and 
commodity prices were relatively stable. 
  Moreover, the evidence in Section 3 indicates that the Federal Reserve’s response to the  
first OPEC oil shock was broadly in line with the prescriptions of the Taylor rule with an inflation 
goal of 5 percent.  Actual consumer inflation jumped up nearly 9 percentage points from 1972Q4 
through 1974Q4, reflecting the winding down of wage and price controls as well as the transitory 
effects of the OPEC oil price shock.  The FOMC responded by tightening the stance of policy, and 
                                                 
19 Indeed, the analysis of Barsky and Kilian (2001) indicates that the OPEC oil price hike of 1973 was not an 
exogenous shock but instead was induced by the accommodative stance of monetary policy over preceding years. 27 
 
the federal funds rate rose from about 6 percent in January 1973 to 10 percent by autumn and to 12 
percent in mid-1974.  Indeed, this policy tightening (which was criticized by numerous observers at 
the time) may have damped the response of inflation expectations to the oil price shock.  In 
particular, one-year-ahead projections in the Livingston survey rose about 3 percentage points, and 
the longer-run inflation expectations of bond investors appear to have moved up by around a 
percentage point or so.   
Natural Rate Misperceptions 
  Some analysts have argued that policymakers’ misperceptions of potential output growth 
and the natural unemployment rate were the primary reason that the stance of monetary policy was 
excessively accommodative in the late 1960s and the 1970s.
20  Our analysis indicates that such 
misperceptions may well have contributed to short-term inflation pressures over this period but 
cannot explain the evolution of longer-run inflation expectations and hence do not provide a 
complete account of the causes of the Great Inflation.   
  From an analytical perspective, policymakers’ misperceptions of natural rates tend to 
induce persistent errors in the setting of the policy instrument, which in turn causes inflation to 
deviate from the longer-run goal.  Nevertheless, such policy mistakes and the associated inflation 
outcomes should be transitory, as long as the inflation goal itself remains fixed and credible.   
In particular, the private sector should anticipate that policymakers will gradually revise their 
natural rate estimates in response to incoming information—including inflation outcomes that are 
persistently higher than expected—and hence that the stance of monetary policy will subsequently 
be adjusted to bring the inflation rate back to the specified goal.  Thus, in the absence of any other 
considerations, this hypothesis implies that the private sector’s longer-run inflation expectations 
                                                 
20 See Orphanides (2002, 2003). 28 
 
should remain stable even if actual inflation is elevated due to policymakers’ natural rate 
misperceptions.   
  In contrast, as we have seen in Section 2, longer-run inflation expectations did indeed shift 
up markedly during the Great Inflation.  In effect, by 1970, investors appear to have lost confidence 
that policymakers would take sufficient actions—even over a horizon of 5 or 10 years—to bring 
inflation back to the level of about 1 to 2 percent that had prevailed during the mid-1950s and early 
1960s.  As for the late 1970s, surveys of consumers and professional forecasters as well as 
Treasury bond data indicate that inflation expectations became completely unhinged.  In contrast, 
longer-run inflation expectations remained fairly stable at around 4 to 5 percent during the first half 
of the 1970s—precisely the period over which Orphanides (2002) concluded that policymakers’ 
natural rate misperceptions were particularly large. 
  Although narrative evidence is inherently subject to alternative interpretations, our reading 
of that evidence appears to be consistent with Meltzer (2003, 2010a, 2010b) in casting doubt on  
the degree to which natural rate misperceptions played a fundamental role in explaining the Great 
Inflation.  The following points are noteworthy: 
  (i) Martin served as Federal Reserve Chairman from April 1951 through January 1970.  
When inflation began rising in 1965-68, Martin delayed tightening mainly due to concerns about 
coordination with anticipated adjustments in fiscal policy, particularly the expectation—supported 
by the analysis of Federal Reserve staff and of the Council of Economic Advisors—that the tax 
surcharge that was finally enacted in May 1968 would curtail aggregate demand and induce a 
significant decline in inflation.
21  Nonetheless, Martin recognized the pitfalls of having kept 
monetary policy on hold, noting in December 1967:  “The horse of inflation is out of the barn and 
                                                 
21 See the discussion in Bremner (2004), pp. 251-256.  Meltzer (2010a) notes that as of late spring 1968, the Federal 
Reserve and the Administration had similar macroeconomic forecasts in which “inflation would fall gradually to  
about 2.5 percent by mid-1969.” (Chapter 4, p. 49) 29 
 
already well down the road.  We cannot return the horse to the barn...but we can prevent it from 
trotting too fast.”
22  In 1969, after it became clear that the tax surcharge had not restrained 
aggregate demand or inflation, the Federal Reserve moved decisively to tighten the stance of 
policy.  In a front-page interview with The New York Times, Martin stated:  
“It appears that the Federal Reserve was overly optimistic in anticipating immediate 
benefits from fiscal constraint...but now we mean business in stopping inflation.... 
A credibility gap exists in the business and financial community as to whether the  
Federal Reserve will push restraint hard enough to check inflation.  The Board means  
to do so and is unanimous on that point.” (New York Times, February 27, 1969, p.1) 
The funds rate rose from 6 percent in early January to around 9 percent by June—that is, the  
ex ante real funds rate increased from a roughly neutral value of about 2 percent to a very tight 
level of around 5 percent—and the Federal Reserve maintained that stance of policy through the 
end of Martin’s term in January 1970.
23  Following the appointment of Arthur Burns to succeed 
Martin in February 1970, however, the Federal Reserve reversed course.
24  As a consequence,  
the funds rate declined about 4 percentage points over the course of the year, even though trend 
inflation and inflation expectations had not turned downward.   
  (ii) By the mid-1970s, policymakers were well aware of the difficulties in estimating 
potential output and the natural unemployment rate.   For example, in testimony to the Joint 
Economic Committee in February 1976, Burns “firmly rejected the idea that anyone could give an 
accurate numerical value for full employment.  Any number was both unreliable and subject to 
change.”
25  Similarly, at the May 1978 FOMC meeting, Federal Reserve staff indicated that 
                                                 
22 FOMC Minutes, December 12, 1967, p. 98. 
23 Martin filled the remainder of his predecessor’s term as Federal Reserve governor from 1950 to 1956 and was then 
appointed to a full 14-year term on February 1, 1956.  Because no Federal Reserve governor may serve more than one 
full term, January 31, 1970 also marked the conclusion of Martin’s final four-year term as Federal Reserve Chairman. 
24 Maisel (1973) described the discussion at Burn’s first FOMC meeting on February 10, 1970 as “the most bitter 
debate I experienced in my entire service on the FOMC.” (p.250)  See also Meltzer (2010b), Chapter 6. 
25 Meltzer (2010b), Chapter 7, p.120. 30 
 
estimating the natural rate of unemployment was “a very difficult problem,” and Committee 
members referred to a wide range of estimates.
26 
  In summary, the narrative evidence confirms that natural rate misperceptions did not play  
a significant role during the onset of the Great Inflation (1965-70) and were not the key factor 
driving the surge in actual and expected inflation during the late 1970s. 
Misperceptions of the Sacrifice Ratio   
  A number of studies have emphasized the extent to which policymakers’ misperceptions  
of the sacrifice ratio may have played a key role in the Great Inflation.
27  Indeed, the narrative 
evidence suggests that concerns about the prohibitive cost of disinflation may well have 
contributed to the marked shift in the stance of monetary policy during 1970.  According to the 
minutes of a Federal Reserve Board meeting in November 1970, Chairman Burns stated that  
“...the Federal Reserve could not do anything about [union wage pressures] except to impose 
monetary restraint, and he did not believe the country was willing to accept for any long period  
an unemployment rate in the area of 6 percent.  Therefore, he believed that the Federal Reserve 
should not take on the responsibility for attempting to accomplish by itself, under its existing 
powers, a reduction in the rate of inflation to, say, 2 percent.”
28   
  Nevertheless, our evidence does not support the view that the ultimate magnitude of the 
Great Inflation can be attributed to misperceptions of the sacrifice ratio.  In particular, a monetary 
policymaker with strong concerns about the sacrifice ratio would perceive the cost of reversing an 
upward shift in inflation expectations as prohibitively high and hence would rationally decide to 
keep inflation expectations anchored as firmly as possible.  In contrast, as we have seen, the actual 
                                                 
26 Meeting Transcript, Federal Open Market Committee, May 16, 1978, p. 6.  For further details of this discussion,  
see Meltzer (2010b), Chapter 7, p. 71. 
27 See Sargent (1999), Primiceri (2006), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006), among others. 
28 Hetzel (1978) gives this excerpt from the minutes of the Federal Reserve Board meeting on November 16, 1970.   31 
 
stance of monetary policy was highly accommodative during the final two years of Burns’ 
chairmanship—with the ex ante real federal funds rate remaining at or below zero—even though 
consumer inflation was rising rapidly towards double-digit levels.  Under Chairman Miller, the 
Federal Reserve shifted to a roughly neutral stance of policy but did not place any substantial 
downward pressure on inflation.  As a result, longer-run inflation expectations (which had 
remained reasonably stable until 1977) picked up markedly by mid-1979.   
Time Inconsistency Problems 
  Some analysts have argued that the Great Inflation resulted from time inconsistency 
problems in the conduct of monetary policy.
29  In particular, under the assumption that the central 
bank cannot make credible commitments regarding the path of policy, the policymaker's incentive 
to produce inflationary outcomes is an increasing function of the natural rate of unemployment.  
Thus, at least in principle, an upward trend in the natural rate of unemployment during the 1960s 
and 1970s could have induced the coincident upward trend in inflation. 
  The evidence in Sections 2 and 3 contradicts this hypothesis.  First, actual and expected 
inflation moved up during the late 1960s, that is, before policymakers were even aware that the 
natural unemployment rate had shifted upwards.  Second, longer-run inflation expectations 
remained at a plateau of about 4 to 5 percent from 1970 to 1975, whereas econometric analysis 
indicates that the natural unemployment rate continued rising steadily throughout the 1970s as a 
consequence of demographic shifts and technological factors.  Finally, this hypothesis does not 
provide any motivation for the sequence of stop-start episodes that occurred over the course of  
the Great Inflation. 
                                                 
29 See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Ireland (1999), among others.  For a contrary view, 
see Beyer and Farmer (2007). 32 
 
Political Factors 
  If all these explanations seem inconsistent with our data, then what factors generated  
the recurring sequence of stop-start policies and the corresponding upward drift of longer-run 
inflation expectations?  We think the most plausible explanation is a combination of periodic 
political pressures on the Federal Reserve and a lack of clear guidelines that would have helped 
policymakers to resist those pressures.  
  One well-known example of such political pressure is the instance when President Johnson 
took Federal Reserve Chairman Martin “out to the woodshed” in December 1965, shortly after the 
Federal Reserve Board approved an increase in the discount rate.
30 Transcripts of President Nixon’s 
office recordings have revealed the pressures faced by Chairman Burns in the early 1970s.
31   
A variety of documents have underscored the political pressures on the Federal Reserve during the 
early years of the Carter Administration.
32   
  In contrast, the conduct of monetary policy became relatively well-insulated from political 
pressures after the Great Inflation.
33  The clarification of Federal Reserve accountability that came 
with the introduction of regular monetary policy reports and testimony under the “Full 
Employment and Balanced Growth Act” (1978) likely helped defuse some of the political pressures 
on the Federal Reserve.  And in the early 1980s, President Reagan voiced consistent strong support 
for Chairman Volcker’s policies, thereby initiating a pattern of acknowledging the Federal 
                                                 
30 A first-hand account of this episode is given in Califano (1991), pp.108-110.  Further background is provided  
by Bremner (2004), pp.209-211. 
31 See Abrams (2006).  For example, shortly after announcing Burns’ nomination as Federal Reserve Chairman,  
Nixon had a private conversation with Burns and told him, “I know there’s the myth of the autonomous Fed.”  Burns 
(1979) also highlighted these pressures:  “My conclusion that it is illusory to expect central banks to put an end to the 
inflation that now afflicts the industrial economies does not mean that central banks are incapable of stabilizing actions; 
it simply means that their practical capacity for curbing an inflation that is driven by political forces is very limited.” 
32 See Kettl (1986), Biven (2002), Weise (2008), and Meltzer (2010b). 
33 Some legislative measures in the mid-to-late 1970s gave an early sign of this trend.  The Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy deliberations were specifically exempted from the requirements of the “Government in the Sunshine Act” 
(1975), and these deliberations were also exempted from the GAO audits that were instituted under the “Federal 
Banking Agency Audit Act” (1978). 33 
 
Reserve’s operational independence that was generally followed by subsequent administrations.  
Perhaps most importantly, by the late 1970s the general public became acutely familiar with the 
high costs of inflation, and that awareness has provided the ongoing foundation for monetary 
policies aimed at fostering price stability along with maximum sustainable employment.
34 
Lessons for the Future 
  If political factors are the primary explanation for the Great Inflation, then what actions 
might be taken to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence?  Our analysis suggests that simple  
rules can be valuable in providing transparent benchmarks for the conduct of monetary policy.   
For example, the Taylor (1993) rule specifies a quantitative inflation objective of 2 percent and 
prescribes adjustments to the stance of policy that would be expected to foster the achievement  
of that objective over time.  Moreover, this rule is specified in terms of the current inflation rate 
and output gap, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of relying on any given model for generating 
macroeconomic forecasts.   
  On occasion, of course, policymakers might find compelling reasons to modify, adjust,  
or depart from the prescriptions of any simple rule, but in those circumstances, transparency and 
credibility might well call for clear communication about the rationale for that policy strategy.   
For example, while the Taylor rule embeds a constant value of the equilibrium short-term real 
funds rate, denoted as r*, economic theories and empirical evidence suggest that r* may move 
gradually and persistently in response to a shift in the trend rate of total factor productivity growth.  
Thus, under circumstances of elevated uncertainty about trend productivity growth, there could be 
significant benefits from monitoring statistical and model-based indicators of r*. 
 
                                                 
34 Meltzer (2010a) notes that in Gallup polls from 1978 to 1982, more than 50 percent of respondents listed inflation  
and the high cost of living as the most important problem facing the country. 34 
 
5.  Conclusion 
  In this paper, we have characterized the evolution of long-run inflation expectations and the 
stance of monetary policy over the period from 1965 to 1980, and we have employed this evidence 
to distinguish among various competing explanations regarding the causes of the Great Inflation.   
  Using survey-based measures and financial market data, we have shown that long-run 
inflation expectations rose markedly from 1965-69, remained elevated but stable through the mid-
1970s, and then deteriorated at an alarming pace from 1977 to 1980.  We have also shown that the 
course of monetary policy over this period is well represented by a sequence of stop-start episodes 
that occurred in 1968-70, 1974-76, and 1979-80.  In each case, belated policy tightening induced a 
contraction in economic activity, but that stance of policy was not sustained long enough to bring 
inflation back to previous levels.   
  Finally, we have shown that several prominent explanations of the Great Inflation do not 
stand up to the evidence and that the most plausible explanation is a combination of periodic 
political pressures on the Federal Reserve and a lack of clear guidelines that would have helped 
policymakers to resist those pressures.  This analysis suggests that the risk of a recurrence of the 
Great Inflation—as well as other significant policy mistakes—could be addressed through the use 
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